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1 Introduction
Since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 governments and central banks in the
US and Europe have taken a number of actions to remedy the situation. Their policy actions
include scal stimulus packages, monetary policies (e.g. Fed funds interest rate cut to near zero on
12.16.2008), liquidity supports (e.g. U.S. Term Auction Facility on 12.12.2007 and 12.21.2007; ECB
liquidity injection on 08.09.2007), nancial sector policies (e.g. U.S. Troubled Assets Relief Program
on 10.03.2008) and other measures such as bailouts and assisted mergers (e.g. SachsenLB capital
injection on 08.02.2007; Northern Rock liquidity support facility on 09.14.2007; Merril Lynch sale
to Bank of America on 09.15.2008).
In this paper we analyze how the respective stock markets, banking stocks in particular, per-
ceived those policy actions from the two sides of the Atlantic. To that end we use the policy news
database constructed by Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa (2012) to investigate
the immediate reactions of systemically important banking stock across Europe and US. In par-
ticular we analyze the abnormal returns and the induced volatilities corresponding to the several
types of key policy announcements by US and European authorities during the crisis as identied
by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012). The nancial crisis has impaired the whole stock market but has
especially destabilized the banking sector. The market reactions to the various policy announce-
ments are of great interest to the scholars and the policy makers seeking the best ways to reverse
the negative market sentiment and to halt the economic contagion.
The dynamics of the stock prices during the crisis period indicate strong heteroskedastic volatil-
ity and cross-sectionally diverged volatility which would impair the power of the traditional tests
of signicance of the abnormal returns. Our empirical strategy is based on the exponential general
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model with announcement dummies which
is a variant of the approach suggested by Savickas (2003). This approach is a natural one given our
focus on how policy announcements a¤ect stock returns and volatility under serially heteroskedastic
volatility.
Furthermore, the crisis period is dotted with a large number of potentially important announce-
ments from the US and European authorities which refer to di¤erent policy types or policy mixes.
They exhibit a large degree of clustering overtime which implies that using event windows of a few
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days around each announcement, as is typically done in event studies, would result in overlapping
events rendering the interpretation of the results quite di¢ cult. To reduce the number of overlap-
ping events we thus focus only on the immediate stock response on the announcement day, i.e., we
use a one-day event window. Hence this study is an investigation of immediate market responses
to policy announcements and does not aim to provide an analysis on the long-term e¤ectiveness of
policies.
Several studies examine the role of policy actions during the recent subprime mortgage crisis.
See for example McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008), Baba and Packer (2009), Panetta, Faeh,
Grande, Ho, King, Levy, Signoretti, Taboga and Zaghini (2009) and Taylor and Williams (2009).
The two papers most closely related to our own are King (2009) and Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst,
Nowak and Tamirisa (2012). King (2009) studies the market reaction around the subprime crisis
particularly to bank rescue packages announced in six countries and shows that bank stock prices
continued to underperform in all countries except US. The traditional event study methodology
with 100 day event windows used by the author does not consider serial heteroskedasticity, event
induced volatility and overlapping events. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) construct a detailed database of
macroeconomic and nancial sector policy initiatives, also employed in this paper, and investigate
the impact of policy announcements in the US, UK, the euro area, and Japan during the subprime
mortgage crisis. Their focus though is di¤erent. To examine the impact on interbank credit and
liquidity risk premia they analyze the immediate response on the Libor-OIS spread. Like King
(2009), they do not address the problem of serial heteroskedasticity and event induced volatility.
Our ndings suggest that overall US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the banking
industry than European policy announcements. In particular, the announcements of monetary
policies and nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal
returns compared to related announcements of the European authorities while the announcements
of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during
the crisis. The ndings are in line with the literature documenting that the US news a¤ect the
behavior of asset prices around the world but that the opposite is not true (Andersen et al. 2003,
Becker et al. 1995, Ehramann and Fratzscher 2003, Wongswan, 2006). We also nd that the policy
announcements, regardless of which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from, have increased the
return volatility during the crisis. Our results lend additional support to the literature documenting
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event-induced volatility increases (Savickas 2003, Harrington and Shrider 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy announcements and data.
Section 3 explains our econometric approach for estimating the impact of policy actions. Section 4
reports our empirical results while Section 5 concludes with a summary of our ndings.
2 Policy Announcements and Stock Data
2.1 Policy Announcements
The policy event database we apply is constructed by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) and covers major
policy announcements from 06.01.2007 to 03.31.2009 by the authorities in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the euro area during the subprime nancial crisis. The events sample is subdi-
vided into a Pre-Lehman period (06.01.2007 to 09.12.2008) and a Post-Lehman period (09.15.2008
to 03.31.2009). Policy announcements in the euro area contain those by the European Central
Bank (ECB) and country authorities from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Spain. The policy announcements included are those which are considered as
watershed policy events. To identify major policy events the authors search front-page articles
where the policy announcement is the main subject. Announcements appearing as front-page news
one day before and up to three days after the date of the o¢ cial announcement are qualied as
watershed events.
The policy announcements are next classied in six groups: scal policies; monetary policies;
liquidity supports; nancial sector policies; policy inaction and bailouts/failures; other measures.
Each group, except scal policies and other measures, is further subdivided so that the policies are
ultimately divided into twelve categories. The number of policy event days for each category is
reported in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
Fiscal policies are economic stimulus measures such as public spending, tax reductions and job
creation associated with an expansion in government expenditures.
Monetary policies are categorized in two groups, interest rate cuts and quantitative and credit
easing. The latter group includes central banks purchase of longer-term government bonds (quan-
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titative easing) or private assets such as commercial papers and mortgage backed securities (credit
easing).
Two types of liquidity support policies are included, domestic currency liquidity support and
foreign currency swaps. The former group consists of central banks actions providing liquidity
of domestic currency through measures such as discount rate cuts, extending maturity, creating
auction facilities and expansion of the auctions, for instance. The latter group mostly consists of
the US dollar liquidity-providing operations which are coordinated actions by the ECB and the
FED.
Financial sector policies are classied into three types, asset purchases, liability guarantees and
recapitalizations. The rst group includes programs purchasing bad loans and risky assets such
as mortgage backed securities from troubled nancial institutions. The second group consists of
policies such as establishing schemes which protect consumer deposits and guarantee debt obliga-
tions of nancial institutions. The last group includes capital injections to the banks directly or
indirectly through recapitalization programs.
Policy inaction and bailouts/failures are divided into three subgroups, interest rate increases/unchanged,
bailouts and assisted mergers, and failures. The second and third groups include decisions to rescue
(or not to rescue) particular nancial institutions rather than establishing a comprehensive rescue
program.
Other measures consists of other major policy announcements not included in the above groups.
Figure 1 provides a sample timeline of policy announcements.
[Insert Figure 1]
The high frequency of the various policy announcements and their overlapping nature is evident
from the gure. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) cautions about the overlapping events in the data base
which would cause an identication problem contaminating the analysis. In order to reduce the
number of overlapping announcements several e¤orts were undertaken by them.1 In this paper we
employ the main event class of policy announcements (announcements featured as a main event on
the frontpage) in the database. Moreover, a one-day event window is used to further reduce the
1For instance they have employed ve-day, three-day and one-day event windows showing their results are robust
to the potential overlapping events problem.
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number of overlapping events.2
2.2 Data
The European and US banks included in our study are listed in Annex 1 and 2 respectively.3 Our
criteria for the selection are as follows. First, we rank the European and US banks according to
their total assets at the end of 2006.4 Then we extract the top one hundred banks and we keep
those which are publicly traded. We repeat the same selection with end of 2010 data and hold
banks which appear in both lists. After this ltering, twenty nine European banks and seventeen
American banks remain in the nal samples.5 Daily returns of Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500 are
used as proxies of the market return for the European and US markets respectively.
The overall test period is extends from 01.03.2005 to 10.14.2011. We further dene the crisis
period as the period covering the announcement data. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) refer the onset of the
crisis to Nowak et al. (2011) who nd a structural break in the bond market data in June 2007 and
the end to the G20 LeadersSummit held in London on 04.02.2009. Lehmans bankruptcy is widely
accepted as perhaps the most dramatic crisis event that changed drastically market expectations.
Hence, we use this event to subdivide our data. To summarize, our test period covers the following
distinct four subperiods:
 tranquil period (01.03.2005 - 05.31.2007);
 pre-Lehman period (06.01.2007 - 09.12.2008);
 post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 - 03.31.2009);
 recovering period (04.01.2009 - 10.14.2011).
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the log daily returns of three equally weighted portfolios
 All banks, European banks only, and US banks only.
[Insert Table 2]
2We have considered to use wider event windows to capture the anticipation and possible lagged e¤ects. However
the number of overlapping announcements triples from 41 to 138 if we extend to a three-day event window (1 day
before and 1 day after the announcement) .
3Our sample covers all the globally systemically important nancial institutions dened by the Basel committee
on banking supervision in November 2011 except for Banque Populaire (a French institution not publicly traded) .
4Bankscope data are used to create the ranking.
5Although they survived the selection criteria we also eliminate from the US sample the government-sponsored
enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Sallie Mae due to their particular quasi-public nature.
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The negative sign and the size of the mean returns (minus16 bps in the pre- and minus 67 bps
in the post-Lehman periods) indicate the extent of the loss during the crisis period (06.01.2007 -
03.31.2009), while the widened range (1173 bps in the pre- and 3013 bps in the post-Lehman periods)
and the enlarged standard deviation of returns (188 bps in the pre- and 544 bps in the post-Lehman
periods) demonstrates the volatile state of the nancial markets. The standard deviation has surged
more than ten-fold for the US banks from the tranquil to the post-Lehman period. Such strongly
time-varying volatility would impair the results from a traditional event study approach. In order
to overcome this problem we apply a GARCH-based approach suggested in the literature (Corhay
and Tourani-Rad 1996, Brockett et al 1999, Savickas 2003, Balaban and Constantinou 2006).
The table also reports the return correlation between the European portfolio and the US port-
folio. As it has been observed in preceding crashes the correlation has increased during the crisis
period (King and Wadhwani 1990, Lee and Kim 1993, Calvo and Reinhart 1996, Baig and Goldfajn
1999, Forbes and Rigobon 2002).
The data also show a sharp increase in cross-sectional variation of individual stock return
volatility during the crisis period consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The cross-sectional
standard deviation of the mean returns has increased from 4 bps in the tranquil period to 10
bps in the pre-Lehman and then to 33 bps in the post-Lehman periods. In order to highlight this
variation we compute the 100 days rolling window volatility of daily returns for each stock. Then
for each sub-sample, European banks and US banks, and for each day, the cross-sectional standard
deviations of the rolling window volatility are computed. Figure 2 plots the time series of the
cross-sectional standard deviations of the rolling window volatility.
[Insert Figure 2]
The gure clearly demonstrates the strong surge of the cross-sectional variation of return volatil-
ity during the pre-Lehman period which reached a peak during the post-Lehman period. Given
the strong cross-sectional variation in return volatility during the crisis period the volatility e¤ect
of policy announcement is likely not to be the same across stocks, which could produce event-
induced variance increases (Harrington and Shrider 2007). The approach we employ to overcome
this problem is outlined in the next section.
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3 Methodology
The event study method has been commonly used to analyze market responses to the policy an-
nouncements in crisis periods (see for example, Aït-Sahalia et al., 2011, Kho et al.,2000, Miyajima
and Yafeh, 2007 and Ongena et al., 2003 for example). However, the presence of heteroskedastic
volatility of stock returns observed in the previous section would impair the power of the traditional
tests. In order to tackle this problem we implement a variation of the generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity, GARCH (Bollerslev, 1986) -based approach suggested by Savickas
(2003). More specically, we employ the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (EGARCH) model to allow for asymmetric e¤ects between positive and negative
returns (Nelson, 1991).
As in the traditional event study methodology we relate the daily log return of stock i, rit; to
the daily log return of the market portfolio, rmt; via the market model. Then our EGARCH-based
approach estimates the following model:
rit = 0;i + 1;irmt + 2;irmtD

t + 
k
r;i;jD
k
j;t + "i;t; "it = i;teit;
ln
 
2i;t

= 0;i + 1;i [j"i;t 1j   i"i;t 1] + i ln
 
2i;t 1

+ kv;i;jD
k
j;t
(1)
for k = E;US where policies announced by European (US) authorities are labeled as E (US). feitg
is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables following the standard
normal distribution.
Dt is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the crisis period and 0 for the tranquil period.
This allows the market betato be dependent on the state of the economy and nancial markets
(McQueen and Roley 1993, Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur 1995). In this study the crisis period
is dened as 2007.06.01 to 2009.03.31 which contains the above mentioned pre- and post-Lehman
periods.6 Hence, 1;i is the market beta during the tranquil period and 1;i + 2;i is the market
beta during the crisis period.
Dkj;t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the type j policy announcement days or 0
6Table 2 shows that the average return of sample stocks was negative during thepre- and post-Lehman periods
while it was positive during the tranquil and recovery periods.
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otherwise. We use a one day event window [0], i.e., announcement day 0, to minimize the number
of overlapping events.7 The groupings of the policy actions are as specied in the previous section.
Consequently, kr;i;j represent the type j policy announcementsaverage e¤ect on bank is stock
return  the abnormal return  while kv;i;j represents the average e¤ect on the volatility  the
event induced volatility. Unlike kv;i;j which represents the total e¤ect of policy announcements on
volatility, since the market return is included in the equation, kr;i;j does not represent the total
e¤ect on single stock returns. Rather, the parameters capture the part of the e¤ect not absorbed
by the market which is specic to each bank.
With each daily return series of banking stocks i, model (1) is estimated for each policy type
j for k = E;US. Then we cross-sectionally test whether the banking industry specic reaction
to the type j policies is statistically di¤erent from zero. Hence the null hypothesis to be tested is
kr;i;j = 0 for the abnormal return, and 
k
v;i;j = 0 for the event induced volatility. Having included
Dkj;t into the volatility equation in model (1) we are taking account of the cross-sectionally diverged
event induced volatility (Savickas 2003, Harrington and Shrider 2007). Furthermore, the EGARCH
set up allows each stocks volatility to behave conditionally heteroskedastic. Then, similar to the
method used by Savickas the test statistic we implement for the abnormal return is:
testkr;j =
S
k
r;i;j
se

Skr;i;j
 ; (2)
where
Skr;i;j =
LX
l=1
bkr;i;j
L
qb2i;j;l ; S
k
r;i;j =
NX
i=1
Skr;i;j
N
; and se

Skr;i;j

=
vuut 1
N (N   1)
NX
i=1

Skr;i;j   S
k
r;i;j
2
(3)
for k = E;US: L is the number of type j policy announcements, bkr;i;j is the estimate of kr;i;j , andbi;l is the estimated conditional standard deviation of abnormal return on event day l. Similarly,
the statistical signicance of event induced volatility is tested with a variant of the test statistic
7To examine the reactions of European banking stocks to policy actions taken by the US authorities and considering
the time di¤erence between the two sides of the Atlantic the one day event window is set to [+1] (i.e., announcement
day +1) . Furthermore, when the news is announced in the weekend the event day is postponed to the following
Monday for our estimation.
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introduced by Balaban and Constantinou (2006):
testkv;j =
S
k
v;i;j
se

Skr;i;j
 ; (4)
where
Skv;i;j =
bkv;i;jqbhi ; S
k
v;i;j =
NX
i=1
Skv;i;j
N
; and se

Skr;i;j

=
vuut 1
N (N   1)
NX
i=1

Skv;i   S
k
v;i;j
2
(5)
for k = E;US: bhi is the standard deviation of the estimated conditional standard deviation series
for bank i. The test statistics are Student-t distributed with N   1 degrees of freedom.
4 Empirical Results
We rst use the overall crisis period (06.01.2007 - 03.31.2009), and then the post-Lehman subpe-
riod (09.15.2008 - 03.31.2009) to examine how the European and the US policy announcements
impact stock returns and volatility. We end the section with a comparison of the impact of policy
announcements on the European banks and the US banks.
4.1 European policy vs US policy: Overall crisis period
We start our analysis with the policy announcements during the crisis period (06.01.2007 - 03.31.2009)
for all banks. In Table 3, we report the cross-sectional average of the estimated abnormal returns,
kr;i;j ; and that of induced volatility, 
k
v;i;j ; from the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1)
for each policy group.
[Insert Table 3]
For ease of interpretation, while we use S
k
r;i;j of equation (3) to construct the signicance test,
the numbers reported in Table 3 are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates.
In the rst and the second column we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns
observed on the European and the US policy announcement days, respectively. In the third column
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we subtract the two gures (European policy - US policy). Ar then represents the di¤erent reactions
between the European and the US policy announcements.
Overall it appears that US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the banking indus-
try than European policy announcements. US policy announcements were signicantly stronger
than European ones for four policy types compared to only one policy type where the inverse holds
true. In particular, the announcements of monetary policies and nancial sector policies by the US
authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal returns. The exceptional case is the announce-
ments by the European authorities concerning asset purchases which outperformed that of the US
authorities by 1.76% on average. It seems that the announcements of the US liability guarantees
had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during the crisis. Turning our attention
now to the standalone reactions to the individual policy types the following observations can be
made.
Fiscal Policy Several stimulus plans, three by the European and six by the US government, were
announced during the crisis. The banking stocks did not react signicantly to these scal policy
measures. This is probably because the direct e¤ects on the banking industry were not clear due
to the contents of the stimulus packages such as job creation, tax cut and infrastructure spending.
Monetary Policy Reductions of the target for the US federal funds rate are accompanied by
signicant abnormal returns. They exceed 20 basis points on the day of the announcement (the
following day for the European banks). On the other hand, the announcements of a decrease
in the renancing rate by the European Central Bank (ECB) or/and a reduction of the o¢ cial
bank rate by the Bank of England (BoE) were not associated with a signicant abnormal return.
The signicantly negative Ar implies that the interest rate cut decisions by the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) had a considerably larger impact on banking stock prices than similar decisions by
the European central banks. This di¤erence could be partially attributed to how drastically the
central banks reduced the target rate. On one hand, the Federal Open Market Committee has
maintained the so-called zero interest rate since December 16th 2008. On the other hand, ECB
(BoE) maintained it to 2.5% (2.0%) on December 4th 2008 and since then gradually decreased it
toward 1.5% (1.0%).
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The quantitative and credit easing policy announcements by the FRB had a weakly signicant
impact of 38 basis points. The largely negative 5.83% average abnormal return on days which
European authorities announced their quantitative and credit easing policies needs a careful inter-
pretation since the e¤ect of the policy announcement was probably distorted by other confounding
announcements.8
Liquidity Support Neither the domestic channel nor the foreign currency swaps channel are
accompanied by signicant abnormal returns. Although not statistically signicant such policies
announced by the US authority had a more favorable impact than the European authorities on
average.
Financial Sector Policies The reported signicant average abnormal return of -1.32% on the
announcement days of US asset purchase programs could be due to the political disagreement
and/or uncertainty of how the bill would be implemented and/or a discouraging monthly jobs report
released on the same date. The asset purchase programs announced by the European authorities
were accompanied by positive abnormal returns on average.9 The signicantly positive Ar implies
that the news on European asset purchase programs were absorbed by the market more favorably.
Conversely, the impact of liability guarantee by the US government was signicantly larger than
the respective impact of European policies. While the European policies were not e¤ective enough
to surmount negative news the US policy announcements were accompanied by a 73 basis points
abnormal return on average which was the largest favorable e¤ect among all twelve policy classes.
The average abnormal return following the US announcements of recapitalization was positive
and signicantly larger than the reaction following the European announcements. Such announce-
ments by European authorities were associated with an 80 basis points negative abnormal return,
which could be due to the disturbing news on the huge loss faced by RBS.
8There are only two policy announcements recorded as quantitative and credit easing in the database. On one of
the announcement days,RBS said it expects to report a 2008 loss of GBP 22 billion to GBP 28 billion (Wall Street
Journal, 20 January 2009) and hence the entire banking industry was largely shocked. It seems that the news of
setting up an asset purchase programme by the BoE was not strong enough to overcome the discouraging news from
RBS.
9Although it is not statistically signicant, considering that the announcement e¤ect is distorted by the disturbing
news of a huge loss by RBS, its favorable impact could be not negligible.
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Policy Inaction and Failures/Bailouts Abnormal returns of positive 29 and 35 basis points
followed the interest rate increases/unchanged by the European monetary authorities and the FRB,
respectively. The market could perceive such policy inactions as central banks conrmation of a
better outlook for the banking industry.
News about bailouts and assistant mergers were not accompanied by signicant abnormal re-
turns. By contrast, the average abnormal returns following the US news about bank failures was
signicantly positive, which is hard to interpret.10
Volatility E¤ects In the fourth and fth column of Table 3 we report the cross-sectional average
of the event induced volatility estimates for the European and the US policy announcements from
the maximum likelihood estimation of model (1). In the sixth column we present their di¤erence.
Av therefore, represents the di¤erence in the volatility e¤ects between the European and the US
policy announcements. The results show that all types of policy announcements  regardless of
which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from  increased return volatility. Our results lend
additional support to the literature documenting event-induced volatility increases (Savickas 2003,
Harrington and Shrider 2007). The clear cut result suggests that it was extremely di¢ cult for
policy makers to provide stability in the market during the crisis period. We do not nd any
statistically signicant Av which indicates that the magnitude of induced volatilities was similar
for the European and the US policy announcements.
4.2 European policy vs US policy: Post-Lehman period
Consistent with Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), we expect market response to policy announcements
to depend on the stage of the crisis. Thus we next focus on the impact of policy announcements
during the post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 - 03.31.2009). We report the results in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4]
10European stocks have surged on the following day of the announcement of the failure of IndyMac. According to
Dow Jones, it was because of thenews from the U.S. that the Federal Reserve and Treasury will o¤er a lifeline of
fresh credit to mortgage nanciers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ... Banks were also boosted after Banco Santander
conrmed an all-share deal of GBP1.3 billion for Alliance & Leicester (Dow Jones 2008.07.14).Moreover, both the
European and the US markets reacted positively after the announcement of the failure of the NetBank. This could
be because of the optimisitic statement made by the FDIC that "In good times as well as in bad, banks have failed
... It wouldnt be realistic to say that there will be absolutely no more failures, but the vast majority of banks will
be able to withstand any problems because of their near historically high capitalization (The Wall Street Journal
2007.09.30).
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On the whole, the US policy announcements seem to have more positive e¤ects than the Eu-
ropean policies which conrms the results presented above. In ve cases Ar are negative and
statistically signicant at the 5% level (four of them are signicant at the 1% level) while in two
cases the Ar are positive and signicant.
In contrast to the result based on the entire crisis period, Ar for bailouts and assisted mergers
turned positive and highly signicant. The di¤erent reactions of the market could be because many
of the actions categorized as bailouts and assisted mergers taken by the European authorities during
the post-Lehman period were bailouts (e.g. Fortis and Hypo Real Estate rescued 09.29.2008; Dexia
rescued 09.30.2008), while many of those taken by the US government were assisted mergers (e.g.
Merrill Lynch sale to Bank of America 09.15.2008; WaMu purchased by JPMorgan 09.15.2008; Wells
Fargos purchase of Wachovia 10.12.2008). The series of announcements concerning reorganizations
of the US nancial industry appears to be absorbed as negative news by the market.
Turning our attention now to the standalone reactions to the individual policy types, all US
policy announcements on monetary policies, liquidity supports, and nancial sector policies  except
asset purchases  are associated with positive abnormal returns on average. Among them, four cases
show a larger reaction  e.g. 265 basis points increase of foreign currency swaps case  compared
to our previous estimation results which may imply that the impact of such policy announcements
by the US authorities had strengthened after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.11 In contrast,
we do not nd any statistically signicantly positive abnormal returns accompanied by such policy
announcements by the European authorities; ve of them were negative on average (three of them
are highly signicant at the 1% level). This may imply that the announced contents of the European
policies could not positively surprise the market enough and thereby its favorable impact did not
exceed the discouraging outlook for the banking industry.
Although for few cases the average induced volatility show negative signs all of the statistically
signicant ones are positive. The insignicant Av s show that there was no di¤erence in the size
of induced volatility by the European policies and the US policies on average, consistent with the
ndings during the entire crisis period.
11Note that there is no sample policy announcements for three categories  quantitative and credit easing, asset
purchases, and recapitalization  during the pre-Lehman period. Hence the estimation results for those three policy
types reported in Table 4 are the same as in Table 3.
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4.3 European banks vs US banks
We next explore the possibly di¤erent reactions of the European banking stocks and the US banking
stocks to same type of policy announcements during the post-Lehman period. For each subsample
we test the statistical signicance of the abnormal returns with the same approach applied in the
previous section. Here we focus on the abnormal returns corresponding to the announcements of
monetary policies, liquidity supports and nancial sector policies which are mostly system-wide
measures and are accompanied by signicant impacts as seen in the previous section.
[Insert Table 5]
Panel A in Table 5 reports the cross-sectional average of the abnormal returns and of the induced
volatility for the European banks, while Panel B reports those for the US banks. For three cases
the US policy announcements were perceived more favorably by the European markets (Panel A)
and US markets (Panel B) compared to the European policy announcements at the 1% signicance
level. On the other hand, there is only one case where the European policy announcements were
perceived more favorably by European markets. The results suggest that the US announcements
impact the behavior of stock prices of both sides of the Atlantic but not vice versa. The ndings are
in line with the literature documenting that the US news a¤ect the behavior of asset prices around
the world but that the opposite is not true (Andersen et al. 2003, Becker et al. 1995, Ehramann
and Fratzscher 2003, Wongswan, 2006).
Finally we take in account the role of expectations or market anticipation to the announcements
which can potentially be important. We address this potential problem by examining the di¤erential
reactions of European and US banking stocks to the same policy announcements. It is assumed
that di¤erential reactions to the same announcement would neutralize any market anticipations if
these anticipations are wide-spread.
[Insert Table 6]
The di¤erences in reactions are reported in Table 6. The rst column in the table subtracts the
rst column of Panel B from the rst column of Panel A in Table 5. It represents the di¤erence
in the abnormal returns between European and US banks
 
Br

following the European policy
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announcements. The second column repeats the same for the US policy announcements.12 We do
not nd any signicantly negative di¤erence, Br ; for the European policies even at the 10% level;
ve cases exhibit a positive sign (two of them are statistically signicant at the 5% level). On
the other hand, we nd a signicantly positive di¤erence, Br ; for the US policies at the 1% level;
three cases exhibit a positive sign while four cases exhibit a negative sign (one is signicant at the
10% level). Overall, the results may imply that the US policy announcements might have stronger
e¤ect on either market on average, while the European policy announcements tend to have stronger
e¤ects only on the European stock returns which is consistent with the ndings in the previous
section.
5 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to study how the stock markets  banking stocks in particular 
perceived the policy actions from the two sides of the Atlantic around the subprime crisis. To that
end we use the policy news database constructed by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) to investigate the
abnormal returns and the induced volatilities corresponding to key policy announcements by US
and European authorities. The sample banks consist of systemically important institutions across
Europe and US. The dynamics of the sample stock prices during the crisis period indicate strong
heteroskedastic volatility and cross-sectionally diverged volatility, which would impair the power
of the traditional event study to test the existence of abnormal returns. We use an EGARCH-
model with event induced volatility which allows the test statistic to be correctly adjusted for these
problems.
Our nding suggest that overall US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the Euro-
pean and US banking industry than European policy announcements. In particular, the announce-
ments of monetary policies and nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied
by higher abnormal returns compared to related announcements of European authorities while the
announcements of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock
returns during the crisis. The lead role of US policies compared to European policies was strength-
12Br with a positive sign in the rst column indicates that the European policy announcements had a stronger
e¤ect on the European stock returns; a negative sign indicates the opposite, their impact was stronger on the US stock
returns. On the other hand, Br with a positive sign in the second column indicates that the US policy announcements
had a stronger e¤ect on the European stock returns; a negatives sign indicates the opposite.
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ened after the collapse of Lehman brothers. Finally, we also nd that the policy announcements,
regardless of which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from, has increased the return volatility
during the crisis. Our results lend additional support to the literature documenting event-induced
volatility increases (Savickas 2003, Harrington and Shrider 2007).
Our ndings do not provide strong direct indications of the level of the policy impacts and
indeed there are several caveats that deserve mention. First, we observe some negative abnormal
returns which are counter intuitive considering that policy actions are attempts to provide a positive
impact. For instance, it is hard to reason that monetary policies such as interest rate cuts have
a negative e¤ect on the state of banking industry. Hence, it is likely that the observed negative
abnormal return is a consequence of distortional e¤ects delivered by other factors (e.g., negative
news arrival) rather than the announced policy itself.
Second, expectations or market anticipation to the announcements can potentially be very
important. We address this problem by examining the di¤erential reactions of European and US
banking stocks, Br ; assuming that di¤erential reactions would neutralize any market anticipations
if these anticipations are wide-spread.
Third, our analysis su¤ers from cross-sectional event date clustering. As the literature has
pointed out (e.g., Kolari and Pynnönen 2010), since the event day is the same for sample stocks
cross-sectional correlation among abnormal returns may create statistical issues. Kolari and Pyn-
nönen (2010) proposed a cross-correlation and volatility-adjusted version of Boehmer, Musmeci
and Poulsen (1991) test statistic. While their statistic is robust to induced volatility and cross-
correlation it does not adjust for the serial heteroskedasticity which we can accommodate by uti-
lizing an EGARCH model.
Lastly, this study does not provide an analysis on he long-term e¤ectiveness of policies. Instead,
it is an investigation of immediate market responses to policy announcements. Some policies may
have been di¢ cult to assess by the market in the short-term. For instance, announcements on
unconventional measures such as the US asset purchasing program were accompanied by negative
immediate responses by the banking stocks which could reect the uncertainty of how the bill
would be used. But of course it does not necessarily mean that the program had a long-term
negative e¤ect. Literature studying the long-term e¤ect of policies extends the event window to
analyze cumulative abnormal returns (e.g. King (2009) uses 100 days event window). However,
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this approach would bring another problem of event window contamination,i.e., multiple events
during the same event window.
Nevertheless these limitations are common in the literature studying market reactions to policy
announcements with an event study approach. In particular, the overlapping event problem is
unavoidable when using data in daily frequency.13
A more di¢ cult and interesting question we have not addressed in this study is whether the
banking stocks reacted to the content of the policy announcements and/or to the (mainly negative)
economic outlook provided together with the announcements during the subprime crisis. We leave
this interesting topic for future research.14
13Recent literature analyzes market reponses to news using intra day data. See for example Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold and Vega (2003, 2007), Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2007), Conrad and Lamla (2010), Rosa (2011).
14The communication by the Central Bank has been studied by e.g., Born, Benjamin, Michael Ehrmann and Marcel
Fratzscher (2011).
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Annex 1
List of Banks and their Total Assets: Europe
Bank Name Country Total Assets Total Assets
code (mil $) 2006 (mil $) 2010
BNP Paribas FR 1,896,935 2,669,907
Deutsche Bank AG DE 2,070,022 2,546,272
HSBC Holdings Plc GB 1,860,758 2,454,689
Barclays Plc GB 1,956,710 2,331,943
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc GB 1,710,636 2,275,479
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 1,660,125 2,129,248
ING Groep NV NL 1,615,049 1,666,368
Banco Santander SA ES 1,098,212 1,626,805
Lloyds Banking Group Plc GB 674,489 1,552,245
Société Générale FR 1,260,162 1,512,656
UBS AG CH 1,922,775 1,401,923
UniCredit SpA IT 1,084,267 1,241,966
Credit Suisse Group AG CH 1,029,219 1,098,345
Commerzbank AG DE 801,184 1,007,882
Intesa Sanpaolo IT 759,626 880,221
Nordea Bank AB (publ) SE 456,855 776,108
Dexia BE 746,402 757,262
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES 542,495 738,560
Natixis FR 604,021 611,984
Danske Bank A/S DK 483,866 572,548
Standard Chartered Plc GB 266,047 516,542
KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA BE 428,553 428,679
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA IT 208,818 326,402
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE 281,808 324,876
Crédit Industriel et Commercial FR 282,251 323,405
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 260,767 320,958
DnB ASA NO 210,901 316,183
Deutsche Postbank AG DE 243,497 286,857
Erste Group Bank AG AT 239,304 275,171
The table reports total assets of the 29 banks at the end of years 2006 and 2010 (in US dollars). Data is collected
from Bankscope. The country codes are as follows. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CH: Switzerland; DE: Germany; DK:
Denmark; ES: Spain; FR: France; GB: United Kingdom; IT: Italy; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; SE: Sweden.
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Annex 2
List of Banks and their Total Assets: United States
Bank Total Assets Total Assets
Name (mil $) 2006 (mil $) 2010
Bank of America Corporation 1,459,737 2,264,909
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 1,351,520 2,117,605
Citigroup Inc 1,884,318 1,913,902
Wells Fargo & Company 481,996 1,258,128
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc 838,201 911,332
Morgan Stanley 1,120,645 807,698
Prudential Financial Inc 454,266 539,854
US Bancorp 219,232 307,786
PNC Financial Services Group Inc 101,820 264,284
Capital One Financial Corporation 149,739 197,503
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 182,162 172,874
State Street Corporation 107,353 160,505
BB&T Corporation 121,351 157,081
American Express Company 127,853 147,042
Regions Financial Corporation 143,369 132,351
Fifth Third Bancorp 100,669 111,007
KeyCorp 92,337 91,843
The table reports total assets of the 17 banks at the end of years 2006 and 2010 (in US dollars). Data is collected
from Bankscope.
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Table 1
Number of Policy Announcement Events
Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Total
European US European US European US
Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy
Fiscal Policy 0 2 3 4 3 6
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts 2 7 7 5 9 12
Quantitative and credit easing 0 0 2 5 2 5
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support 9 10 2 6 11 16
Foreign currency swaps 4 3 1 1 5 4
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases 0 0 5 6 5 6
Liability Guarantees 4 1 15 7 19 8
Recapitalizations 0 0 15 15 15 15
Policy Inaction and Failures/Bailouts
Interest rate increases/unchanged 11 3 2 1 13 4
Bailouts and Assisted Mergers 4 3 3 7 7 10
Failures 0 2 0 1 0 3
Other Measures 2 3 3 7 5 10
The events sample is subdivided into a Pre-Lehman period (06.01.2007 to 09.12.2008) and a Post-Lehman period
(09.15.2008 to 03.31.2009).
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Table 2
Summary Statistics of Daily Portfolio Returns
Tranquil Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Recovery
All Banks
Mean 0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0067 0.0003
Std.dev. 0.0067 0.0188 0.0544 0.0205
Min. -0.0322 -0.0456 -0.1599 -0.1065
Max. 0.0283 0.0717 0.1414 0.1084
European Banks
Mean 0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0064 0.0001
Std.dev. 0.0081 0.0193 0.0506 0.0214
Min. -0.0384 -0.0723 -0.1189 -0.0772
Max. 0.0305 0.0620 0.1573 0.1340
US Banks
Mean 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0072 0.0006
Std.dev. 0.0075 0.0268 0.0797 0.0265
Min. -0.0360 -0.0735 -0.2586 -0.1729
Max. 0.0246 0.1448 0.1930 0.1931
Correlation 0.3758 0.4413 0.5740 0.5438
The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the log daily returns of each portfolio during each
sub-period are reported. The three equally weighted portfolios consist of: All banks; European banks; US banks,
respectively. The observation period is divided into: Tranquil period (01.03.2005 to 05.31.2007); Pre-Lehman pe-
riod (06.01.2007 to 09.12.2008); Post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 to 03.31.2009); Recovery period (04.01.2009 to
10.14.2011). The correlation is calculated between the European and the US portfolio returns.
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Table 3
Reactions of Banking Stocks to Policy Announcements: Overall Crisis Period
Return Volatility
European US Europe US
Policy Policy Ar Policy Policy 
A
v
Fiscal Policy 0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 0.0183 0.0199 -0.0016
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts -0.0023 0.0022 -0.0045 0.0265 0.0247 0.0018
Quantitative and credit easing -0.0583 0.0038 -0.0620 0.0067 0.0090 -0.0023
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0060 0.0190 -0.0130
Foreign currency swaps 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0254 0.0313 -0.0059
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases 0.0044 -0.0132 0.0176 0.1147 0.0100 0.1047
Liability Guarantees -0.0013 0.0073 -0.0086 0.0222 0.0465 -0.0243
Recapitalization -0.0080 0.0017 -0.0097 0.0161 0.0253 -0.0092
Policy Inaction and Failures/Bailouts
Interest rate increases/unchanged 0.0029 0.0035 -0.0006 0.0319 0.0449 -0.0130
Bailouts and Assisted Mergers -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0397 0.0486 -0.0090
Failures 0.0023 0.0099
Other Measures 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0025 0.0046 0.0274 -0.0228
The table reports the cross-sectional average of estimated abnormal returns, bEr;i;j and bUSr;i;j , and that of induced
volatility, bEv;i;j and bUSv;i;j ; from the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1) using the policy announcements
during the overall crisis period (06.01.2007 - 03.31.2009). For ease of interpretation, while we use S
E
r;i;j ; S
US
r;i;j ; S
E
v;i;j ;
and S
US
v;i;j of equation (3) to construct the signicant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross
sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates. In the 1st and the 2nd column we calculate the average of the estimated
abnormal returns observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column
we subtract the two gures (European policy - US policy). Ar then represents the di¤erent reactions between the
European and the US policy announcements. In the 4th and 5th column of the table we report the cross-sectional
average of the event induced volatility estimates. In the 6th column we present the di¤erence. Av therefore, represents
the di¤erence in the e¤ect on volatility between the European and the US policy announcements. The estimates are
statistically signicant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively.
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Table 4
Reactions of Banking Stocks to Policy Announcements: Post-Lehman Period
Return Volatility
European US Europe US
Policy Policy Ar Policy Policy 
A
v
Fiscal Policy 0.0020 -0.0096 0.0116 0.0183 0.0307 -0.0124
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts -0.0051 0.0048 -0.0099 0.0129 -0.0022 0.0151
Quantitative and credit easing -0.0583 0.0038 -0.0620 0.0067 0.0090 -0.0023
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support -0.0021 0.0011 -0.0031 0.0126 0.0385 -0.0259
Foreign currency swaps -0.0302 0.0271 -0.0573 0.0056 0.0381 -0.0325
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases 0.0044 -0.0132 0.0176 0.1147 0.0100 0.1047
Liability Guarantees 0.0009 0.0126 -0.0117 0.0279 0.0263 0.0016
Recapitalization -0.0080 0.0017 -0.0097 0.0161 0.0253 -0.0092
Policy Inaction and Failures/Bailouts
Interest rate increases/unchanged 0.0179 -0.0053 0.0232 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0002
Bailouts and Assisted Mergers 0.0063 -0.0078 0.0141 0.0401 0.0482 -0.0081
Failures -0.0064 0.0102
Other Measures 0.0067 -0.0063 0.0130 0.0281 0.0076 0.0206
The table reports the cross-sectional average of estimated abnormal returns, bEr;i;j and bUSr;i;j , and that of induced
volatility, bEv;i;j and bUSv;i;j ; from the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1) using the policy announcements
during the post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 - 03.31.2009). For ease of interpretation, while we use S
E
r;i;j ; S
US
r;i;j ; S
E
v;i;j ;
and S
US
v;i;j of equation (3) to construct the signicant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross
sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates. In the 1st and the 2nd column we calculate the average of the estimated
abnormal returns observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column
we subtract the two gures (European policy - US policy). Ar then represents the di¤erent reactions between the
European and the US policy announcements. In the 4th and 5th column of the table we report the cross-sectional
average of the event induced volatility estimates. In the 6th column we present the di¤erence. Av therefore, represents
the di¤erence in the e¤ect on volatility between the European and the US policy announcements. The estimates are
statistically signicant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively.
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Table 5
Reactions of European Banks and US Banks: Post-Lehman Period
Panel A: European Banks
Return
European US
Policy Policy Ar
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts -0.0042 0.0099 -0.0141
Quantitative and credit easing -0.0519 0.0081 -0.0600
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support 0.0037 -0.0017 0.0054
Foreign currency swaps -0.0332 0.0272 -0.0604
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases 0.0021 -0.0139 0.0160
Liability Guarantees 0.0047 0.0071 -0.0024
Recapitalization -0.0070 -0.0005 -0.0064
Panel B: US Banks
Return
European US
Policy Policy Ar
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts -0.0065 -0.0038 -0.0027
Quantitative and credit easing -0.0692 -0.0036 -0.0656
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support -0.0120 0.0057 -0.0177
Foreign currency swaps -0.0250 0.0271 -0.0521
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases 0.0082 -0.0121 0.0203
Liability Guarantees -0.0057 0.0220 -0.0277
Recapitalization -0.0097 0.0055 -0.0152
The table reports the cross-sectional average of estimated abnormal returns, bEr;i;j and bUSr;i;j , from the maximum
likelihood estimation of equation (1) using the policy announcements during the post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 -
03.31.2009). For ease of interpretation, while we use S
E
r;i;j ; S
US
r;i;j ; S
E
v;i;j ; and S
US
v;i;j of equation (3) to construct the
signicant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates.
In the 1st and the 2nd column in Panel A we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns of European
banking stocks observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column we
subtract the two gures (European policy - US policy). Ar then represents the di¤erent reactions between the
European and the US policy announcements. Panel B repeats the same for the the US banks. The estimates are
statistically signicant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively.
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Table 6
Reactions of European Banks vs US Banks: Post-Lehman Period
Br
European US
Policy Policy
Monetary Policy
Interest rate cuts 0.0023 0.0137
Quantitative and credit easing 0.0173 0.0117
Liquidity Support
Domestic currency liquidity support 0.0158 -0.0074
Foreign currency swaps -0.0082 0.0001
Financial Sector Policies
Asset Purchases -0.0061 -0.0018
Liability Guarantees 0.0104 -0.0148
Recapitalization 0.0027 -0.0061
The table reports the cross-sectional average of estimated abnormal returns, bEr;i;j and bUSr;i;j , from the maximum
likelihood estimation of equation (1) using the policy announcements during the post-Lehman period (09.15.2008 -
03.31.2009). For ease of interpretation, while we use S
E
r;i;j ; S
US
r;i;j ; S
E
v;i;j ; and S
US
v;i;j of equation (3) to construct the
signicant test, the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates.
The 1st column in the table subtracts the rst column of Panel B from the rst column of Panel A in Table 5.
It represents the di¤erence in the abnormal returns (Br ) following the European policy announcements. The 2nd
column repeats the same for the US policy announcements. The estimates are statistically signicant at 10%; 5%;
and 1%; respectively.
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Figure 1
Sample Policy Announcements from the Two Sides of the Atlantic (2007-2009)
Source: Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa (2012).
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Figure 2
Cross-sectional Standard Deviation of Return Volatility
100 days rolling window volatilities of daily returns for each stock are calculated. Then for each sub-sample, the
European banks and the US banks, and for each day, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the rolling window
volatilities are computed. The gure plots the time series of the cross-sectional standard deviations of the rolling
window volatility.
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